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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NOTICE IN VIRGINIA
PROBATE AND ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution declares
that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process of
law.' Among the fundamental requirements of due process of law is that a
person with an interest in a proceeding have an opportunity to be heard,2
which in turn requires adequate notice of the state proceeding. 3 Traditionally,
definitions of adequate notice centered on labeling the court's jurisdiction as
either in rem4 or in personam.5 In personam jurisdiction required personal
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (no state shall deprive any person of property
without due process of law); see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950) (constitution requires adequate notice and opportunity to be heard); Finkel
Outdoor Prods., Inc. v. Bell, 205 Va. 927, 931, 140 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1965) (essential element
of due process of law is notice in judicial proceeding affecting property right); Doe v. Brown,
203 Va. 508, 512, 125 S.E.2d 159, 163 (1962) (although due process requires that person receive
notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard, legislature describes both kind and manner of
notice).
2. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) (under due process clause
state must afford all interested parties meaningful opportunity to be heard); Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (due process requires meaningful opportunity to be heard);
Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897) (due process signifies right to be heard in defense).
3. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(right to be heard is of little value unless interested party is informed of pending proceeding
and interested party can appear, defend, acquiesce, or contest); Schroeder v. City of New York,
371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962) (notice of proceeding is vital corollary to due process right to be
heard); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956) (right to hearing is meaningless
without prior notice of proceeding); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863)
(interested party first must receive notification before enjoying right to hearing).
4. See Hanson v. Denckle, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958) (in rem judgment affects all
persons having interest in property in question); see also The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126,
144 (1815) (dictum) (early Supreme Court discussion of in rem jurisdiction); Note, Requirements
of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1257, 1269 (1957) (in-depth analysis of in
rem jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as Requirements of Notice]. The basis for probate and estate
administration's in rem jurisdiction is the probate court's power over the decedent's property
within the state. See Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196-205 (1977) (jurisdiction in in rem
proceeding is based on court's power over land); see also Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80-
81 (1909) (probate court's jurisdiction is in rem); Gaines v. Fluentes, 92 U.S. 10, 21 (1875)
(nature of probate proceeding is in rem); Grigon's Lesee v. Astor, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 125, 130
(1844) (sale of property of indebted intestate is in rem proceeding); Culpeper Nat'l Bank of
Culpeper v. Morris, 168 Va. 379, 388, 191 S.E. 764, 768 (1937) (probate proceeding is judgment
in rem) (quoting Ballow v. Hudson, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 672, 682 (1857)); Queensbury v. Vail,
123 Va. 219, 221-22, 96 S.E. 173, 174 (1918) (clerk's order admitting will to probate is judgment
in rem and is appealable only within statutory time period and manner proscribed by law);
Avant v. Cook, 118 Va. 1, 7, 86 S.E. 903, 904-05 (1915) (nature of probate proceedings is in
rem); Saunders v. Link, 114 Va. 285, 291, 76 S.E. 327, 330 (1912) (probate orders are in rem
judgments).
5. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 728 (1877) (in personam jurisdiction is based on
state's authority over defendant's person). See generally Developments in the Law-State Court
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service or some other notice equally likely to reach the interested party.6 In
in rem proceedings, however, constructive notice by publication generally
satisfied due process requirements. 7 During the last thirty years, the United
States Supreme Court has questioned the constitutionality of notice require-
ments in various types of in rem proceedings. 8 In Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 9 the Supreme Court abandoned the historical dichotomy
between notice for in rem and in personam proceedings.' 0 To determine the
sufficiency of notice, the Court in Mullane established a balancing test
weighing the state's administrative interest against the individual's interest in
receiving notice of the proceeding." Although the Supreme Court has not
applied the balancing test in a decision involving notice in probate, the
Court's reliance on the balancing test in situations such as notice in condem-
nation and bankruptcy proceedings raises the possibility that the Court could
apply the test to find that the Virginia notice requirements in probate and
estate administration violate due process of law.' 2
Jurisdiction, 73 H~Av. L. Rsv. 909 (1960) (in-depth analysis of all facets of jurisdictional
development).
6. See Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256, 275 (1896) (due process requires appearance
or personal service before judgment is personally binding); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727
(1877) (constructive service in in personam cases is ineffectual for all purposes).
7. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196-204 (1977) (jurisdiction in in rem proceedings
is based on court's power over property within state territorial limits); Huling v. Kaw Valley
Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559, 564 (1889) (publication of notice satisfies due process
of law in in rem cases).
8. See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2709 (1983)
(considering sufficiency of published notice of tax sale to mortgagee); Robinson v. Hanrahan,
409 U.S. 38, 40 (1972) (adjudicating sufficiency of mailed notice prior to foreclosure sale);
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962) (questioning adequacy of publication
and posting of notice in eminent domain proceeding); City of New York v. New York, New
Haven & Hartford Ry., Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1953) (challenging adequacy of published
notice to creditor of bankruptcy proceeding).
9. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
10. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (analysis of dichotomy between notice in
in rem and in personam proceedings).
11. 339 U.S. at 314.
12. See generally infra note 61 (examples of cases citing Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. as precedent). Many state court decisions considered Mullane inapplicable to
probate and estate administration and consequently did not require mailed notice in such cases.
See, e.g., Brunnell Leasing Corp. v. Wilkins, 11 Ariz. App. 165, 166-67, 462 P.2d 858, 859-60
(1969) (Mullane is inapplicable to probate non-claim statutes because probate is in rem
proceeding in which publication is sufficient notice to settle claims of interested parties not
before the court); Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 204, 233 S.E.2d 445, 451 (1976) (publication is
sufficient notice of probate proceedings because judgment is not conclusive for several years);
In re Pierce's Estate, 245 Iowa 22, 27, 60 N.W.2d 894, 897-98 (1953) (Mullane is inapplicable
to admission of will to probate and published notice is not violative of due process since probate
of will is merely preliminary order and does not cut off interested parties right to contest);
Haas v. Haas, 504 S.W.2d 44, 45-46 (Mo. 1974) (Mullane is inapplicable to notice of opening
of estate since state statute confers right to contest probate for specified time period under
special statute of limitations), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 928 (1974), Clapper v. Chandler, 406
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In Virginia, probate 3 and administration' 4 of a decedent's estate involves
a series of court orders, 5 each requiring a distinctive form of notice,' 6 before
ultimate distribution of a decedent's estate. 7 The procedural history of
Virginia probate and estate administration dates from the early English
S.W.2d 114, 118 (Mo. 1966) (notice by publication is sufficient when heirs' addresses are known
because estate administration is single proceeding requiring single notice); Baker Nat'l Bank v.
Henderson, 151 Mont. 526, 529, 445 P.2d 574, 576 (1968) (citing numerous cases for proposition
that Mullane is inapplicable to probate non-claim statutes), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 530
(1969); Continental Coffee Co. v. Estate of Clark, 84 Nev. 208, 213, 438 P.2d 818, 821 (1968)
(Mullane is not applicable to state non-claim statutes); In re Shew's Estate, 48 Wash. 2d 732,
734, 296 P.2d 667, 669 (1956) (Mullane was trust proceeding in personam and does not control
sufficiency of notice in final accounting and distribution of decedent's estate because such
proceedings are in rem); New York Merchandise Co., Inc. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 825, 827-28,
264 P.2d 863, 864 (1953) (Mullane does not apply to creditors of decedent's estate who fail to
comply with mandatory nonclaim statutes).
Several state courts have stressed that the Mullane standard is not applicable to probate
proceedings since, contrary to Mullane, property rights in probate are not adjudicated before a
court but are extinguished by operation of a statute of limitations. See Gano Farms, Inc. v.
Estate of Kleweno, 2 Kan. App. 506, 508, 582 P.2d 742, 744 (1978) (non-claim statute bars
creditors claims against decedent's estate and does not require Mullane notice since not judicial
proceeding); New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 825, 827-28, 264 P.2d 863, 864
(1953) (non-claim statutes bar creditors because of creditor's nonaction and not through court
adjudication requiring Mullane standard of notice for judicial proceedings); Matter of Estate
of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 442, 302 N.W.2d 414, 419 (1981) (Mullane rule applicable to
judicial or quasi-judicial actions or proceedings and not non-claim statutes which function as
statute of limitation). But see Chaffin & Barwick, The Probate and Establishment of Domestic
and Foreign Wills: An Analysis of Statutory Requirements, 13 GA. L. REv. 133, 144 (1978)
(recognizing that probate of decedent's will is judicial proceeding affecting substantial property
interests).
13. See T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS §§ 93-99 (2d ed. 1953) (discussion
of probate and contest of wills). Probate is the process in which the probate court establishes
a will as the last will of a decedent. Id. at § 93; see Tyson v. Scott, 116 Va. 243, 250, 81 S.E.
57, 59 (1914) (probate answers question whether will is true last will and testament of decedent).
See generally D. Dosar & F. BROWN, VIRGINIA PROBATE HANDBOOK (1984) (thorough guide to
current Virginia probate procedure).
14. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 13, at § I (administration is process in which personal
representative of the decedent, under supervision of court, collects assets, satisfies debts, and
distributes remainder of decedent's estate).
15. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 64.1-77 (1980) (clerk's order admitting will to probate); VA.
CODE § 64.1-174 (1980) (court orders personal representative to pay debts and demands against
decedent's estate); VA. CODE § 64.1-179 (1980) (court's order to creditors to show cause against
distribution of decedent's estate).
16. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 64.1-85 (1980) (ex parte probate of will does not require notice
to any interested party); VA. CODE § 64.1-171 (1980) (requiring notice by publication before
Commissioner receives proof of debts against decedent's estate); VA. CODE § 64.1-179 (1980)
(order for creditors to show cause against distribution of decedent's estate mandates published
notice). See M. MERRLL, MERRILL ON NoTIcE § 17 (1952) (courts employ various forms of
notice).
17. See VA. CODE §§ 64.1-171, -180.1 (1980) (statutory law concerning settlement of
accounts and distribution of estate assets).
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ecclesiastical courts.' 8 In the ecclesiastical courts, the Ordinary 9 possessed
the power to probate wills, grant letters of administration, and oversee the
disposition of the decedent's estate.20 Depending on the complexity of the
estate, probate began with the executor's presentation of the will and the
executor's choice of administration either in common form or in solemn
form.2' In common form probate, also referred to as ex parte, the executor
both presented the will and testified that the decedent duly executed the
will.22 Interested parties23 received no notice of the ex parte probate proceed-
ing.24 An interested party who questioned or objected to the common form
probate could file a caveat which compelled the executor to probate the will
in a solemn form proceeding. 25 Solemn form probate, often referred to as
inter partes, required actual notice to interested parties. 26 Any party who
received notice of the solemn form hearing was bound by the order admitting
18. See generally A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, HISTORY OF WILLS 96-159 (1928) (historical
and statutory background of English probate and estate administration); L. SMr.s & P. BASYE,
PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW, 387-93, 511 (1946) (discussion of jurisdiction of ecclesiastical
courts); Levy, Probate in Common Form in the United States: The Problem of Notice in
Probate Proceedings, 1952 Wis. L. Rav. 420, 421-22 (discussion of probate and estate admin-
istration in English ecclesiastical courts).
19. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 989 (5th ed. 1979) (Ordinary at common law possessed
immediate and exempt jurisdiction in ecclesiastical causes); A. RE'PY & L. TOMPKINS, supra
note 18, at 103 (Ordinary at common law usually was Bishop presiding over chief court of
Diocese).
20. See Comment, Probate Procedure-Administration of Decedents' Estates-The Mul-
lane Case and Due Process of Law, 50 MIcK. L. REv. 124, 130 (1951) (discussion of Ordinary's
power in ecclesiastical courts) [hereinafter cited as Probate Procedure].
21. See A. REPPY & L. ToMp ns, supra note 18, at 142 (analysis of differences between
probate in common form and probate in solemn form); Chaffin & Barwick, supra note 12, at
140-41 (emphasizing American courts' adoption of English ecclesiastical courts' common form
and solemn form dichotomy). See generally Atkinson, Brief History of English Testamentary
Jurisdiction, 8 Mo. L. REv. 107, 115-22 (1943) (analyzing history of English ecclesiastical
courts' jurisdiction of testimentary disposition).
22. See A. REPPy & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 18, at 112 (discussing common form probate
after production of will and oath of executor).
23. See M. MER ILL, supra note 16, at § 566 (persons interested in estate administration
include creditors and heirs); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(20) (1969) (defining interested
persons in probate proceeding as heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, and
others with property right in or claim against decedent's estate which probate proceeding may
adversely affect); see also Crowley v. Farley, 129 Minn. 460, 463, 152 N.W. 872, 875 (1915)
(beneficiary under prior will is interested party).
24. See Note, Validity of Probate Notice Statutes in Ohio, 27 U. CIN. L. REv. 76, 80-81
(1958) (common form probate offers no notice to interested parties) [hereinafter cited as Probate
Notice]; Martin, Justice and Efficiency Under a Model of Estate Settlement, 66 VA. L. REv.
727, 732-33 (1980) (ex parte probate does not involve formal hearings).
25. See A. RPPv & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 18, at 112 (filing of caveat results in citation
ordering presence of all interested parties at probate). Executors choice of common form or
solemn form probate depends on factors such as the size of the decedent's estate and the
probability that interested parties will file a caveat. Id.
26. See id. (solemn form probate provides notice to all interested parties and affords
interested parties opportunity both to attend and to be heard).
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the will to probate and could only appeal the order for a limited period of
time.
27
Most early American legislatures adopted statutory variations of the
English ecclesiastical court procedures. 28 However, during the last century
many states amended probate notice requirements to abolish or modify ex
parte probate and require constructive notice to interested parties before the
hearing to prove the decedent's will.29 Virginia still employs the traditional
distinction between common form ex parte and solemn form inter partes
probate.30 Moreover, Virginia's notice requirements for probate and for
estate administration remain virtually unchanged from the statutes enacted
almost two centuries ago.3'
In Virginia, courts have jurisdiction to probate a decedent's will either
in an ex parte proceeding under Virginia Code section 64.1-85 or in an inter
partes proceeding under Virginia Code sections 64.1-79 to -82.32 If the party
admitting the will to probate chooses an ex parte probate proceeding, the
court reviews the will without summoning any interested party.3 However,
a person offering a will to probate can notify voluntarily any interested
party, giving the party an opportunity to show cause why the will should
27. See Chaffin & Barwick, supra note 12, at 141 (solemn form probate is binding upon
any interested parties notified of proceeding and all takers under probated will).
28. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 13, at § 4 (probate procedure in early American statutes
was derived from English ecclesiastical courts); A. REPPY & L. TomPKINs, supra note 18, at 179
(American probate procedure was patterned after ecclesiastical courts of England).
29. See T. ATKnINSON, supra note 13, at § 95 (most states require some notice of probate
proceeding to interested parties). But see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1303 (1974) (proof
of will without notice to interested parties); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-3-8 (1982) (providing for
common form probate); N.H. REv. STAT. Am. § 552:6 (1974) (providing for probate in
common form).
30. Compare VA. CODE § 64.1-85 (1980) (probate in common form) with VA. CODE §
64.1-77 (1980) (probate in solemn form).
31. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 14 tit. 39, ch. 132 (1849) (early statute for receiving proof of
debts by commissioner now embodied in Virginia Code § 64.1-171); 1839 Va. Acts 45 (precursor
to Virginia Code § 64.1-179 requiring creditors to show cause against distribution of real
property to devisees and personal property to legatees); 1838 Va. Acts 72 (early predecessor to
Virginia Code §§ 64.1-85, -89 concerning ex parte probate proceedings and filing of bill of
contest); see Dickens v. Bonnewell, 160 Va. 194, 199-204, 168 S.E. 610, 611-13 (1933) (discussion
of Virginia Act of 1785 providing for probate of decedent's estates); 1751 Va. Acts 159-60 (act
directing probate of wills). See generally VIRGINIA LAWS MERCERS ABRIDGMENT 408 (1759)
(citing 1748 statute of Geo.II for summoning heirs at law, publishing notice, and posting notice
on church doors); COLONtAL LAWS OF VIRGtNIA 1642-1660 (1978) (complete history of Virginia
colonial law); 4 HENNIo'S STATuTEs AT LARGE 1711-1736, 12-13 (1823) (discussion of notice
requirements for probate under 1711 statute of 9th Anne).
32. See VA. CODE §§ 64.1-79, -85 (1980) (providing for probate of wills inter partes and
ex parte). See generally G. Smrr, HARRISON ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION §§ 171-72 (2d ed.
1960) (outline of probate procedure in Virginia).
33. See VA. CODE § 64.1-85 (1980) (ex parte probate does not mandate notice to any
interested party).
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not be admitted to probate. 4 The Virginia Code provides two methods for
interested parties to attack an ex parte probate order. 3 First, Virginia Code
section 64.1-78 allows an interested party to appeal as a matter of right
within six months after the probate order.3 6 Second, Virginia Code section
64.1-89 allows an interested person not a party to the original probate
proceeding to bring suit in equity to impeach or establish the will within one
year after the probate order. 37 After the one year period expires the decree
or order of the probate court is binding.38 Interested non-residents not
appearing or summoned may file a similar bill under Virginia Code section
64.1-90 within two years after the probate court's order or decree.
3 9
In addition to granting exparte probate of the decedent's will, the court
clerk may appoint administrators 4° or qualify executors. 4' Two major func-
tions of an executor or an administrator are settling the decedent's accounts
and distributing the decedent's remaining assets. 42 To expedite settlement of
the decedent's accounts, an executor, administrator, creditor, legatee or
distributee can ask the Commissioner of Accounts, pursuant to Virginia
Code section 64.1-171, to appoint a time and place to receive proof of debts
34. See id. at § 64.1-79 (interested person must be aggrieved in order to appeal probate
court's decree).
35. See Rowland v. Rowland, 104 Va. 673, 676-77, 52 S.E. 366, 367 (1905) (in order for
interested party to appeal probate court decree, interested parties must be aggrieved). Compare
VA. CODE § 64.1-89 (requiring filing of bill to impeach or establish will within one year of
probate) with VA. CODE § 64.1-78 (1980) (requiring appeal from order of clerk within six months
of probate); see also infra text accompanying notes 36-37 (discussion of two methods to attack
ex parte probate order).
36. See VA. CODE § 64.1-78 (1980) (interested parties can appeal from probate order
within six months as matter of right); see also Tyson v. Scott, 116 Va. 243, 253, 81 S.E. 57, 60
(1914) (appeal is not new suit but continuance of old suit). On appeal, an interested party can
demand a jury trial. See VA. CODE § 64.1-89 (1980) (statutory right to trial by jury).
37. See VA. CODE § 64.1-89 (1980) (filing of will in equity within one year).
38. See VA. CODE § 64.1-89 (1980) (Probate decree is forever binding after lapse of one
year contest period). But see Ford v. Gardner, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 71, 84 (1806) (parties to
original probate proceeding cannot subsequently file bill to contest probate unless alleging
fraud). However, lapse of the contest period does not bar probate of a second will. See Eyber
v. Dominion Nat'l Bank, 249 F. Supp. 531, 534 (W.D. Va. 1966) (probate of second will after
lapse of period to contest original will's probate is not precluded since probate or later will is
not attacking judgment to probate first will); In re Will of Bentley, 175 Va. 456, 460, 9 S.E.2d
308, 331 (1940) (statutory period for contesting first will does not effect probate of later
inconsistent will).
39. See VA. CODE § 64.1-90 (1980) (nonresidents not summoned or actually appearing at
probate proceeding are allowed two years to file bill to impeach probate order).
40. See id. at §§ 64.1-77, -118 (1980) (clerk can appoint administrator to oversee probate
of intestate's estate).
41. See id. at § 64.1-77 (1980) (clerk can qualify executors named in decedent's will).
42. See Bickers v. Pinnell, 199 Va. 444, 449, 100 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1957) (goal of settling
accounts and distributing assets of decedent is prompt, certain, efficient, and inexpensive
distribution of decedent's estate), aff'd, 201 Va. 257, 110 S.E.2d 514 (1959). See generally VA.
CODE §§ 64.1-116 to -180.1 (1980) (personal representative's duty is to settle accounts and
distribute assets of decedent's estate).
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against the decedent and the decedent's estate. 43 The Commissioner must
publish notice of the location for receiving proof of debts in a newspaper of
general circulation for ten days prior to the hearing, and also post a similar
notice on the front door of the court house." After filing both the report of
accounts and demands against the decedent's estate, Virginia Code section
64.1-179 permits the court, on motion of the personal representative, legatee,
or distributee, to order creditors and all other interested parties to show
cause against the distribution of the decedent's estate.45 To notify interested
parties, newspapers publish a copy of the order of distribution once a week
for two consecutive weeks. 46
The Virginia notice requirements for probate and estate administration
reflect the traditional distinction between in rem and in personam proceed-
ings. 47 In Mullane, the Supreme Court rejected the distinction between notice
requirements in in rem and in personam proceedings. 4 The Mullane Court
held that publication affords sufficient notice when the names and addresses
of interested persons are unknown, but does not afford notice compatible
with the requirements of due process when the names and addresses of
interested persons are known or ascertainable through reasonable diligence.
49
In Mullane, a New York trust company established a common trust fund
composed of many small trust accounts. 50 The trust company, which exclu-
sively managed and controlled the fund for the resident and nonresident
beneficiaries, petitioned under New York law for a judicial settlement of
accounts. 5' The trust company followed New York law and published notice
43. See VA. CODE § 64.1-171 (1980) (proceeding for receiving proof of decedent's debts);
see also G. SMrrm, supra note 32, at § 509 (discussion of Virginia Code § 64.1-171); B. LAm,
VIRGINIA PROBATE PRACTICE § 115 (1957) (analysis of Virginia Code § 64.1-171).
44. See VA. CODE § 64.1-171 (1980) (requiring notice by publishing and posting prior to
distributing decedent's property).
45. See id. at § 64.1-179 (requiring notice by publication of order for creditors to show
cause against distribution of decedent's estate); see also G. SMrr, supra note 32, at § 514(a)
(analysis of Virginia Code § 64.1-179); B. LAMa, supra note 43, at § 105 (discussion of Virginia
Code § 64.1-179).
46. See VA. CODE § 64.1-171 (1980) (requiring publication of order of estate distribution
for two consecutive weeks). After payment of creditors and delivery of the remainder of the
decedent's estate, the distributees are required under Virginia Code § 64.1-179 to refund a pro
rata portion of the distribution if a party institutes a successful claim within five years against
the decedent or the decedent's estate. See id. § 64.1-179 (five year period for claims against
decedent or decedent's estate is applicable to portions of decedent's estate awarded to legatees
or distributees).
47. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (discussion of traditional in rem and in
personam notice requirements).
48. 339 U.S. at 312.
49. Id. at 314.
50. Id. at 309. The beneficiaries in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. were
both residents and nonresidents of New York. Id.
51. Id. A judicial settlement of accounts is binding and conclusive against parties interested
in the common fund and participating trust. Id.
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of the settlement petition in the local newspaper. 2 The plaintiff, an attorney
appointed to represent the beneficiaries of the common trust fund, brought
suit claiming that the notice by publication violated the due process require-
ment of the fourteenth amendment. 3 Both the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
surrogate court's holding that publication of the beneficiaries' names under
the New York statute satisfied due process of law.5 4 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state requirement of statutory
notice by publication violated due process because the notice was not
reasonably calculated to inform the trust beneficiaries of the proceeding."
The Supreme Court reasoned that while notice by publication was sufficient
for beneficiaries whose identities are unknown, beneficiaries whose names
and residences are reasonably ascertainable should receive notification of the
proceeding through ordinary mail . 6 The Mullane Court suggested that mailed
notice is adequate to protect the property interest of known or reasonably
ascertainable beneficiaries.
57
In Mullane, the Supreme Court stressed that the fourteenth amendment
protects all property interests, and that the type of notice required does not
depend on classification of the action as in rem or in personam." The
Mullane Court adopted a test which balanced the interests of the State in
administrative order and efficiency against the individual's property interest.5 9
52. Id. See N.Y. BANFING LAws, § 100-c(12) (1950) (amended 1951) (requiring notice
published at least once every week for four consecutive weeks informing interested parties of
petition for judicial settlement of accounts).
53. 339 U.S. at 310. The plaintiff in Mullane contended that since the notice provision
violated due process, the court had no jurisdiction to render a final binding decree. Id. at 311.
The surrogate court in Mullane overruled the plaintiff's objections, reasoning that the published
notice satisfied due process requirements. In re Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d
397, 410 (1947).
54. See In re Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 275 App. Div. 764, 88 N.Y.S.2d 907
(1949) (appellate division's affirmance of surrogate court's decision); 299 N.Y. 697, 87 N.E.2d
73 (1949) (court of appeals affirming appellate division of the New York Supreme Court).
55. 339 U.S. at 319. The Mullane Court stated that interested parties residing outside the
circulation of the newspaper had little chance of receiving notice, and many interested parties
within the newspaper's circulation received notice of the proceeding only by chance. Id. at 315.
56. Id. at 318. The Mullane Court recognized the possibility of searching out names of
interested parties. Id. at 317.
57. Id. at 318-19. The Mullane Court noted the importance of timely mailing. Id. at 318.
In addition, the Supreme Court in Mullane stressed that unlike earlier times, the mails are both
an efficient and an inexpensive method of communication. Id. at 319.
58. Id. at 314; see supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (analysis of in rem and in
personan jurisdiction). The Mullane Court deviated from previous Supreme Court decisions
which judged the adequacy of notice depending on the type of jurisdiction the court exercised.
See supra notes 4-5 (citing cases in which Supreme Court relied on dichotomy between in rem
and in personam jurisdiction to determine adequacy of notice).
59. 339 U.S. at 314. In subsequent cases the Supreme Court has stressed that the balancing
test is not a strict formula, and that the relative weights of the state and individual interests
will vary depending on the particular circumstances of the case. See Green v. Lindsey, 456 U.S.
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Despite language in the Mullane decision suggesting a limitation of the
holding to the particular facts of the case, 60 the United States Supreme Court
has applied the Mullane balancing test in a variety of factual situations. 6'
A recent United States Supreme Court case altered the Mullane balancing
test and may represent the direction for future decisions concerning notice
requirements in probate and estate administration. In Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams, 62 the Supreme Court held that when a mortgagee is
deprived of his interest in a tax sale, notice by publication does not meet the
requirements of due process. 63 In Mennonite, the plaintiff, the Mennonite
Board of Missions (MBM), sold real property to a purchaser who executed
a mortgage in favor of MBM. 64 The terms of the mortgage provided for the
purchaser-mortgagor to pay the property taxes. 65 Although the mortgagor
continued to make mortgage payments, the mortgagor, without MBM's
knowledge, discontinued payment of the property taxes. 66 As a result of non-
payment of property taxes, the county sold the property, publishing notice
of the sale pursuant to state law. 67 Despite the published notice, MBM never
444, 455 n.9 (1982) (not court's responsibility to prescribe particular form of service that state
must adopt); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956) (required notice varies
depending on conditions and factual circumstances of particular case).
60. 339 U.S. at 312. The Mullane Court did not want to disturb the distinction between
in rem and in personam jurisdiction in other areas or issues at law. Id. at 312, 314.
61. See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2711-12 (1983)
(published notice of tax sale deprived mortgagees of property interest without due process of
law); Green v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455-56 (1982) (notice posted on defendant's door in
unlawful entry and detainer action was violative of due process); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409
U.S. 38, 40 (1972) (mailed notice informing of foreclosure sale was unreasonable since plaintiff
knew defendant was incarcerated in jail and could not receive mailed notice); Groppi v. Leslie,
404 U.S. 496, 502 (1972) (plaintiff charged with contempt never received proper notice before
sentence and confinement in jail); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971) (plaintiff deprived
of due process when driver's license was revoked without hearing); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 378, 380 (1971) (due process violated when state denied plaintiff access to court for
divorce proceeding); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1962) (publication
and posting insufficient notice in eminent domain proceeding); Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
352 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1956) (notice by publication of condemnation proceeding was violative
of due process when name and address of owner of property affected was known to city);
Covey v. Town of Summers, 351 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1956) (mailed notice to known incompetent
was insufficient notice in tax foreclosure since notice was unlikely to inform interested party or
third party to protect incompetent's interest), appeal dismissed, 354 U.S. 916 (1957); City of
New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953) (publication
was insufficient notice to creditor in bankruptcy proceeding because published notice did not
constitute "reasonable notice" required under state statute).
62. 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
63. Id. at 2711-12.
64. Id. at 2708.
65. Id. The Mennonite Board of Missions is an incorporated charitable administrative
division of the Mennonite Church. See Brief for Appellant at 6 n.3, Mennonite Bd. of Missions
v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2708.
67. Id. at 2709; see IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-1 (Burns 1984) (allowing two year
redemption period for interested parties to reclaim property).
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received actual notice of the tax sale. 68 The county notified the mortgagor
of the tax deficiency and the impending tax sale, but did not notify MBM. 69
The defendant purchased the property at the tax sale.70 During the two year
statutory redemption period, neither the mortgagor nor MBM reclaimed the
property by paying the equivalent of the tax sale price plus interest.
7'
Although losing the property at the tax sale, the mortgagor continued to
make mortgage payments to MBM throughout the redemption period.
72
Consequently, MBM first learned of the tax sale only after the defendant
received the tax deed.
73
After expiration of the two year redemption period the defendant applied
to the county auditor for a deed to the property.74 The defendant then
initiated an action to quiet title.75 MBM objected to the granting of quiet
title on the ground that mere notice by publication violated due process.7
6
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. 77 The defend-
ant's quiet title extinguished MBM's lien on the real property. 78 MBM
challenged the state notice requirements on appeal. 79 The Indiana Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that due process does not require
the state to send actual notice of the tax sale. 0 The Indiana Court of Appeals
reasoned that most mortgagees are sophisticated lenders and should keep
accurate records of the mortgagor's obligation.
8'
68. 103 S. Ct. at 2709.
69. Id. at 2708; see IND. CODE AN. § 6-1.1-24-4 (Burns 1984) (Indiana tax assessor must
send certified mail notice to owner of property subject to tax sale).
70. 103 S. Ct. at 2709.
71. Id.; see IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-1 (Burns 1984) (allowing two year redemption
period for interested parties to reclaim property).
72. 103 S. Ct. at 2709.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-14 (Burns 1984) (county auditor can deliver deed
for property if not redeemed within thirty days).
75. 103 S. Ct. at 2709. The mortgagor in Mennonite failed to contest the action to quiet
title. Id.; see IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-15 (Burns 1984) (purchaser may institute action to
quiet title to property after obtaining deed).
76. 103 S. Ct. at 2709. In Mennonite, the plaintiff contended that it did not receive
adequate notice of the pending tax sale or of the redemption period. Id.
77. Id.
78. See IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-4 (Burns 1984) (tax deed vests fee simple title free
and clear of all liens).
79. 103 S. Ct. at 2709.
80. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 427 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). In
affirming the trial court's holding that Mullane does not apply to tax lien sales, the Indiana
Court of Appeals in Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams relied on Indiana precedent. Id. at
688,690; see First Says. & Loan Ass'n of Cent. Ind. v. Furnish, 367 N.E.2d 596, 600-01 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1977) (refusing to apply notice requirements of Mullane to state tax lien sales). In
First Savs. & Loan Ass'n of Cent. Ind. v. Furnish, the Indiana Court of Appeals held Mullane
inapplicable because Mullane concerned owners of the affected property and Indiana law never
expanded actual notice requirements to nonowners such as mortgagees. Id. at 601.
81. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 427 N.E.2d 686, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). In
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and reversed and
remanded the case. 82 The Supreme Court held that merely posting and
publishing notice of the tax sale amounted to the state taking property
without due process of law because the published notice was not reasonably
calculated to apprise all interested parties of the impending sale. 3 The
Supreme Court in Mennonite reasoned that the published notice was insuf-
ficient under the circumstances since MBM's mortgage lien was ascertainable
from the public land records 4 Relying on the reasoning of Mullane, the
Supreme Court decided that MBM possessed a legally protectable property
interest, and therefore the state must provide notice reasonably calculated to
inform MBM of the tax sale.s The Mennonite Court explained that MBM's
ability to protect its interest did not mitigate the state's constitutional
obligation to provide adequate notice of the judicial proceeding.86 The
Mennonite Court concluded that mailed notice or other means to ensure
actual notice is a prerequisite to any proceeding which adversely affects the
property interests of any known or ascertainable interested party.
87
Although the Mennonite Court imposed a rigid notice standard for tax
sales, the Nevada Supreme Court cited Mennonite as precedent in a recent
probate case. 88 In Continental Insurance Co. v. Moseley (Moseley II),89 the
Supreme Court of Nevada held that notice by publication to creditors of a
Mennonite, the Indiana Court of Appeals stated that although the Mennonite Board of Missions
(MBM) was not a professional money lender, MBM voluntarily entered the market and assumed
the risk. Id. at 690 n.9. The Court of Appeals in Mennonite further noted that MBM failed to
take protective measures such as conditioning the mortgage to require the mortgagor to send a
copy of paid taxes, providing an escrow account to pay the tax assessment, or periodically
checking the public records to ensure that the mortgagor paid the tax assessment. Id.
82. 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2711. The Mennonite Court noted that since MBM's mortgage was publicly
recorded, any constructive notice also must have included either mailed notice to MBM's last
known address or personal service. Id. The Mennonite Court reasoned that constructive notice
is sufficient notice only when the mortgagee is not reasonably ascertainable. Id.
85. Id.; see supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussion of Mullane "reasonably
calculated" standard for determining adequacy of notice).
86. 103 S. Ct. at 2712. The Mennonite Court stated that a mortgagee's knowledge of
delinquent taxes is not equivalent to notice of a pending tax sale. Id.
87. Id. The dissent in Mennonite criticized the majority's rigid formula for determining
due process notice requirements. Id. at 2713 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that
under the Mennonite majority's strict approach, constructive notice is never sufficient notice.
Id. The Mennonite dissent further reasoned that the rigid formula was "squarely at odds" with
the Mullane balancing of state interests and individual interests. Id.; see supra note 11 and
accompanying text (Mullane balancing test). The Mennonite dissent would have found that the
state's interest in tax collection outweighed MBM's mortgagee interest. See 103 S. Ct. at 2716
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88. Compare Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2712 (1983) (notice
must be "ensured" to reach interested individual) with Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) (notice must be "reasonably calculated" to reach interested
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decedent's estate violates due process if the executor or administrator pos-
sesses actual knowledge of the creditor's claim.90 In Moseley ,9g a case
decided before the United States Supreme Court handed down Mennonite,
a creditor of a decedent's estate brought suit alleging that the state's notice
provision violated due process. 92 In Moseley I, the executor of the decedent's
estate had actual knowledge of the creditor's claim against the estate. 93 The
executor of the estate followed the state's requirement of notice by publica-
tion and took no additional steps to notify the known creditor.94 The Supreme
Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's holding that the state notice
requirement to creditors satisfied due process requirements. 95 The Moseley I
Court reasoned that published notice to creditors was sufficient to provide
actual notice to the creditor. 96 In barring the creditor's claim, the Moseley I
court stressed the state's interest in efficient and expedient estate administra-
tion.
97
The United States Supreme Court vacated the Nevada Supreme Court's
judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Mennonite
decision. 9s On remand, 99 the Nevada Supreme Court, in Moseley II, reversed
the Moseley I decision.20 The Moseley 11 court applied the rationale of
Mennonite to hold that a creditor's claim against the decedent's estate is a
sufficient property interest in the estate to require more than mere notice by
individual). The apparent difference in notice requirements in Mullane and Mennonite corre-
sponds to the Mennonite Court's higher standard of due diligence in identifying interested
parties. Compare Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2711 n.4 (creating
"reasonably diligent effort" standard for identifying interested parties) with Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 317, 320 (establishing "reasonably ascertainable"
standard for identifying interested parties).
89. 100 Nev. 74, 683 P.2d 20 (Nev. 1984).
90. Id. at. , 683 P.2d at 21.
91. 98 Nev. 476, 653 P.2d 158 (Nev. 1982).
92. Id. at 477, 653 P.2d at 159.
93. 100 Nev. 74, 683 P.2d at 20.
94. Id. at....., 683 P.2d at 21; see NEv. Rav. STAT. § 145.050 (1983) (requiring published
notice of appointment of executor of decedent's estate); see also id. at § 145-060 (1983) (creditors
must file claims against decedent's estate within 60 days after notice is first published).
95. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 98 Nev. 476, 479, 653 P.2d 158, 161 (1982). In
Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, the Supreme Court of Nevada recognized that Nevada Revised
Statute § 145.050 would bar some creditors' claims, but concluded that the courts cannot
alleviate the result of the legislative enactment. Id., 653 P.2d at 160-61; see NEv. REv. STAT. §
145.060 (1983) (creditors must file claims prior to 60 days after notice is published). The
Moseley court concluded that the published notice requirement under Nevada Revised Statute
§ 145.060 satisfied the Mullane standard of notice since the published notice was reasonably
calculated to provide actual notice to all creditors. 98 Nev. at 478, 653 P.2d at 160.
96. 98 Nev. at 478, 653 P.2d at 160.
97. Id.
98. 103 S. Ct. 3530 (1983).
99. 100 Nev. 74, 683 P.2d 20 (1984).
100. Id. at., 683 P.2d at 21.
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publication when the executor possesses actual knowledge of the creditor's
claim against the decedent's estate. 0'
The Supreme Court's decisions in Mennonite and Moseley I suggest a
constitutional requirement of mailed notice to interested parties before
probate and before distribution of a decedent's estate. 0 2 Five principal
arguments support a due process requirement of mailed notice to known or
ascertainable interested parties before probate and known or ascertainable
creditors of the decedent's estate before distribution. 13 First, the in rem
nature of the probate court's jurisdiction does not determine the adequacy
of the state's notice requirements in subsequent probate and estate adminis-
tration proceedings. 04 A significant difference exists between the basis for
the probate court's jurisdiction and the manner in which the probate court
exercises jurisdiction. 0
Although the court's in rem jurisdiction over property is relevant in
determining which state has authority to probate a decedent's will, the in
rem nature of the court's jurisdiction does not determine the adequacy of
the state's notice requirements. 0 6 The United States Supreme Court decisions
in Mullane and Mennonite typify the Court's move away from a strict
classification of proceedings as in rem or in personam, and require notice
adequate under the circumstances. 0 7
A second argument supporting a due process requirement of mailed
notice to known or ascertainable interested parties of the decedent's estate
is that despite several early Supreme Court decisions, the Court increasingly
101. Id.; see NEv. REv. STAT. § 155.020 (1983) (requiring published notice to all creditors
of decedent's estate).
102. See supra notes 65-87 and accompanying text (discussion of Mennonite); notes 89-101
and accompanying text (discussion of Moseley).
103. See infra notes 104-39 and accompanying text (discussion of principal arguments
supporting mailed notice to interested parties before probate and estate administration).
104. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950)
(requirement of due process under fourteenth amendment does not depend on classification of
court's jurisdiction as in rem or in personam); see also supra note 4 (probate and estate
administration are in rem proceedings). But see Brunnell Leasing Corp. v. Wilkins, 11 Ariz.
App. 165, 166-67, 462 P.2d 858, 859-60 (1969) (Mullane is inapplicable to probate non-claim
statutes since probate is in rem proceeding); Clapper v. Chandler, 406 S.W.2d 114, 118-19 (Mo.
1966) (due to in rem nature of probate proceedings, notice by publication is sufficient when
heirs' addresses are known); In re Shew's Estate, 48 Wash. 2d 732, 734, 296 P.2d 667, 669
(1956) (Mullane was proceeding in personam and does not control sufficiency of in rem notice
in final accounting and distribution of decedent's estate).
105. See Note, Notice Requirements in California Probate Proceedings, 66 CALr. L. REv.
1111, 1117 (1978) (citing critical distinction between basis for court's jurisdiction and manner
in which court exercises jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as California Probate Proceedings].
106. See id. (differentiation between basis and exercise of court's jurisdiction).
107. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2710 n.3 (discussion of
Mullane and Court's rejection of traditional distinction between in rem and in personam
jurisdiction as determinative of type of notice required under due process of law); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 312 (requirements of due process under
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has looked with disfavor upon proceedings that violate the modern concept
of due process of law. 08 In the nineteenth century case of Robertson v.
Pickrell,'0 9 the Supreme Court approved of Virginia's ex parte probate
procedure." ' Moreover, in Farrell v. O'Brien,"' the United States Supreme
Court held that probate in common form, followed by a one year period to
contest, satisfied the due process requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment." 2 The United States Supreme Court also has approved constructive
notice in estate administration proceedings."' In Goodrich v. Ferris,1"4 the
fourteenth amendment do not depend upon classification of court's jurisdiction as in rem or in
personam).
108. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) (striking down state replevin statute
patterned after early English common law); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-
42 (1969) (holding prejudgment garnishment statute violated due process of law); Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (due process is dynamic everchanging concept); Freitas v.
Gomes, 52 Hawaii 145, 152, 472 P.2d 494, 498-99 (1970) (historical procedures once satisfying
due process must yield to changing concept of fairness which due process requires); Haas v.
Haas, 504 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Mo. 1974) (Seiler, J., concurring) (meaning of due process of law
has changed considerably and courts now disfavor ex parte proceedings adversely affecting
property rights), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 928 (1974). But see Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett,
321 U.S. 233, 244 (1944) (whether procedure is well known and customary is important in
determining whether procedure conforms to due process of law); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co.,
260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) (procedures practiced with approval for hundreds of years will require
strong proof that procedure violates due process of law).
109. 109 U.S. 608 (1883).
110. Id. at 611. The Supreme Court decided Robertson v. Pickrell under a statute allowing
for a seven year contest period which raises the possibility that the Court would decide the case
differently under the current Virginia Code's one year contest period. Compare Robertson v.
Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608, 609 (1883) (applying seven year probate contest period) with VA. CODE
§ 64.1-89 (1980) (current statute allowing one year to contest probate).
111. 199 U.S. 89 (1905).
112. Id. at 118. In Farrell v. O'Brien, the heirs of a decedent challenged the probate of a
noncupative will. Id. at 100. The heirs claimed failure of notice under Washington law resulted
in nullifying the probate. Id. at 117. The Farrell Court held that the Washington statute
contained adequate remedies for the heirs since the statute provided for contests within a one
year period. Id. at 118. The Farrell Court reasoned that there was an adequate remedy, provided
the interested party contests within the statutory prescribed time period. Id. The Farrell court
suggested that the heirs' allegation amounted to asserting that every state statute allowing
common form probate violates due process. Id. See Case of Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 503, 517 (1874) (one year limit to contest probate is complete and effective to attain
ends of justice and truth). In Case of Broderick's Will, heirs of a decedent bought suit
challenging the probate of a will on the ground of insufficient notice of the probate proceeding.
Id. at 504-05. The heirs, residents of New South Wales, received no actual notice of the
California domiciled decedent's death or the California probate of the will. Id. at 504, 507.
The heirs did not learn of Broderick's death until after the one year contest period had lapsed.
Id. at 508. The Supreme Court held that the heirs cannot seclude themselves from information
and claim immunity from probate laws in order to reopen probate. Id. at 519. The Broderick's
Will Court reasoned that permitting the heir to prevail would disturb all in rem proceedings.
Id. at 518.
113. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (discussion of Supreme Court's approval
of constructive notice in estate administration).
114. 214 U.S. 71 (1909).
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Court upheld the constitutionality of notice by publication and posting of
the executor's final settlement and distribution. 1 5 Furthermore, in Christian-
son v. King County," 6 the Supreme Court held that notice by publication of
an accounting and distribution of an intestate's estate does not violate the
fourteenth amendment."17 The precedential value of the Supreme Court cases
concerning notice in probate and estate administration, however, is question-
able."" For example, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,19 the Supreme
Court held that a state statute allowing prejudgment garnishment of wages
violated due process of law even though decades earlier the Court upheld a
similar wage garnishment provision. 20 The Mennonite and Moseley II deci-
sions support mailed notice to known or ascertainable creditors before
distribution of the decedent's estate.' 2 ' Therefore, the Supreme Court's
holdings in Mennonite and Moseley I should severely restrict the precedential
value of the Goodrich and Christianson decisions which upheld the consti-
tutionality of notice by publication and posting to all interested parties.
22
115. Id. at 81. In Goodrich v. Ferris, the plaintiffs, residents of New York, filed a bill
seven years after estate distribution to set aside the executor's final accounting and distribution
decree. Id. at 77-78. The plaintiffs in Goodrich contended the California probate code violated
due process because interested parties received no actual notice of the final settlement and
distribution of the estate, and the statute required only a ten day publishing or posting of
notice. Id. at 79; see CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1633-44 (1887) (requiring published and posted notice
before distribution of decedent's estate). The Supreme Court in Goodrich held that the settlement
of accounts and final distribution satisfied due process as to all interested parties. 214 U.S. at
81. The Goodrich Court found the notice requirements just and the plaintiffs' contention
meritless because the in rem nature of probate proceedings permit notice by publication and
posting. Id.
116. 239 U.S. 356 (1915).
117. Id. at 372-73. In Christianson v. King County, the heirs of an intestate decedent
contended that published notice of the administrator's final accounting and distribution violated
due process. Id. at 372. The heirs claimed that the informal appointment of the administrator
to the decedent's estate barred the probate court's jurisdiction. Id. The heirs in Christianson
alleged that since the probate court never acquired jurisdiction, the probate proceeding was null
and void. Id. The Supreme Court, however, held that published notice satisfied due process of
law under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 373. The Christianson Court concluded that the
probate court possessed competent jurisdiction, and that the valid statutory notice requirement
bound the world to the probate court's judgment. Id.
118. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) (striking down state replevin statute
patterned after early English common law); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-
42 (1969) (holding that prejudgment garnishment statutes violate due process of law).
119. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
120. Id. at 341-42; see Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 115-16, 141 A. 699, 702, aff'd,
279 U.S. 820 (1928) (per curiam) (upholding constitutionality of wage garnishment procedures
similar to procedures found violative of due process in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.); Ownbey
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 109 (1921) (wage garnishment statute held constitutional).
121. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2712 (1983) (holding mail
or other notice certain to ensure actual notice is minimum constitutional requirement in
proceeding adversely affecting any party's property interest); Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley,
100 Nev. 74,-, 683 P.2d 20, 21 (Nev. 1984) (requiring more than published notice to
creditors known or ascertainable to executor or administrator of decedent's estate).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 114-17 (citing Goodrich v. Ferris and Christianson
v. King County as supporting published notice in administration of decedents' estates).
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A third reason to support a due process requirement of mailed notice to
known or ascertainable interested parties of the decedent's estate is that the
existence of a statutory time period to contest probate or estate administration
does not exclude interested parties' property interests from the protections
of due process. 23 Arguably, the existence of a statutory period to contest or
appeal probate orders or distribution decrees results initially in a temporary
deprivation of property. 24 However, the Supreme Court has held that due
process protects against even a temporary deprivation of a property right.'21
Moreover, an interested party's right to be heard is of little value unless the
interested party is informed of the probate proceeding or estate administra-
tion and can appear, default, or contest before the expiration of the
statutorily determined period of limitation. 26 The United States Supreme
Court's vacating of the Moseley I decision, a case involving a statutory
redemption period, supports the view that the mere existence of a statutory
time period to contest probate proceedings may not ensure adequate due
process protection to a known or ascertainable interested party. 27 Since
123. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962) (due process clause
protects "legally protected interests" rather than "property interests"). But see Farrell v.
O'Brien, 199 U.S. 89, 118 (1905) (failure to give notice does not hinder opportunity to contest
probate of will); In re Pierce's Estate, 245 Iowa 22, 27, 60 N.W.2d 894, 897 (1953) (probate
order does not conclude rights of interested parties because interested parties can contest original
probate proceeding within statutory contest period).
124. See Note, The Constitutionality of the No-Notice Provisions of the Uniform Probate
Code, 60 MINN. L. REv. 317, 333 (1976) (arguing that probate is not final order encompassed
under protection of fourteenth amendment due process clause because of statutory period to
contest) [hereinafter cited as Constitutionality of No-Notice Provisions]; see also In re Pierce's
Estate, 245 Iowa 22, 27, 60 N.W.2d 894, 897-98 (1953) (probate is preliminary order and does
not cut off interested parties right to contest).
125. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972) (citizens are protected against temporary
seizure of property under due process). But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 618
(1974) (seizure of property without prior notice is permitted). The statutory notice provision in
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., is distinguishable from the Virginia Code ex parte probate notice
procedure since the statute in Mitchell provides for mandatory notice immediately after seizure
of the property. See LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN., Art. 3506 (1961) (providing for immediate
post-termination hearing). In contrast, under the Virginia Code's exparte procedure no similar
assurance exists that interested parties will receive notice of probate. See VA. CODE § 64.1-85
(1980) (exparte probate does not require notice to any interested party).
126. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see
also Comment, Notice-Probate Procedure-1967 Draft of the Uniform Probate Code, 53
IOWA L. REv. 508, 515 (1967) (opportunity to contest probate of will is valuable only if
interested party receives notice before statute of limitations expires) [hereinafter cited as Uniform
Probate]; Constitutionality of No-Notice Provisions, supra note 124, at 331 (contest period is
inconsequential if party never is informed of probate proceeding); Boyd, Some Suggestions for
a Model Estates Code, 47 MINN. L. REv. 787, 801-02 (1963) (contest period is meaningful only
if coupled with adequate notice); Probate Notice, supra note 24, at 84 (contest period usually
is not helpful to interested party who is unaware of decedent's death).
127. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 100 Nev. 74,-, 683 P.2d 20, 21 (1984)
(published notice to creditor violated due process notwithstanding two year redemption period);
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1962) (published notice violates due
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notification of all known or ascertainable interested parties to a decedent's
estate is not guaranteed under the traditional Virginia ex parte probate or
by publishing and posting of estate administration proceedings, the existence
of a period to contest may not overcome the apparent constitutional defi-
ciency in Virginia's notice requirements.'2
A fourth argument supporting a due process requirement of mailed
notice to known or ascertainable interested parties of the decedent's estate
is that once the Virginia legislature creates a statutory right to succeed to a
decedent's property, the United States Constitution requires that all interested
parties receive the constitutional protections of procedural due process in the
distribution of the estate.2 9 Although each state statutorily defines what
constitutes property, a state is not free to limit property rights protected by
the fourteenth amendment due process requirement of adequate notice. 30
Therefore, while the United States Constitution does not require Virginia to
create a statutory right to inherit, a consequence of Virginia enacting probate
and estate administration statutes is that Virginia must administer the notice
provisions to afford all interested parties due process protections guaranteed
process despite statutory period to appeal proceeding). In Schroeder v. City of New York, the
United States Supreme Court disregarded the existence of a statutory time period to appeal a
condemnation proceeding and held that posted notice of the condemnation proceeding failed to
satisfy due process requirements. Id. Commentators cite Schroeder for the proposition that a
statutory period to contest does not preclude a due process attack asserting inadequate notice.
See, e.g., Uniform Probate, supra note 126, at 514 n.44 (Schroeder cited for proposition that
lack of finality is not defense against due process claim of inadequate notice); Constitutionality
of No-Notice Provisions, supra note 124, at 330-31 (citing Schroeder for proposition that value
of contest period is linked to adequate notice of proceeding); Boyd, supra note 126, at 801-02
(referring to Schroeder for proposition that statute of limitations does not cure jurisdictional
defect of inadequate notice of proceeding).
128. See Note, Validity of Probate Notice Statutes in Ohio, 27 U. CIN. L. REV. 76, 84
(1958) (contest period usually is not helpful to interested party unaware of decedent's death);
Requirements of Notice, supra note 4, at 1270 (interested party is not always aware of decedent's
death); Uniform Probate, supra note 126, at 514-15 (opportunity to challenge probate order or
decree does not guarantee protection of interested parties' property interest in decedent's estate).
129. See California Probate Proceedings, supra note 105, at 1119 (proposing that once
state creates statutory scheme governing inheritance, state must administer scheme to satisfy
due process requirements). The Supreme Court supports due process guarantees for statutorily
created rights. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) (statutorily
created right to employment exists for untenured faculty member); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 539 (1971) (statutorily created right to driver's license requires hearing before suspension);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (statutorily created welfare rights exist under
federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and New York State's
Home Relief Program). See generally Comment, Due Process-The Requirement of Notice in
Probate Proceedings, 40 Mo. L. REv. 552, 557 (1975) (United States Supreme Court cases hold
that due process requirement applies to termination of statutory entitlements) [hereinafter cited
as Due Process]; California Probate Proceedings, supra note 105, at 1118-19 (discussion of
application of due process requirements to statutorily created rights).
130. See J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 546 (2d ed. 1983)
(state can define or limit property rights because property is creature of state).
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under the fourteenth amendment.' The Virginia legislature therefore may
impose restrictive conditions on testamentary disposition or intestate succes-
sion only if the limitations and restrictions do not violate due process.
32
A final argument supporting a due process requirement of mailed notice
to known or ascertainable interested parties of the decedent's estate before
distribution is that a second state may not afford full faith and credit to
Virginia probate decisions concerning personal property situated outside the
state of the decedent's domicile if the probate proceedings lacked adequate
notice.3 3 The United States Constitution provides for full faith and credit
between states. 4 However, before enforcing a Virginia probate judgment, a
second state can question the jurisdiction of the Virginia probate court
rendering the decree or order. 35 The Virginia probate may be subject to
collateral attack if an interested party who failed to receive notice never
waived or adjudicated the personal property interest due to the inadequacy
of the Virginia probate notice provisions. 3 6 If another state determines that
the Virginia probate court lacked proper jurisdiction, the second state might
consider the judgment void as a violation of due process and not accord full
131. See Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (right to succeed to decedent's
property is not constitutionally guaranteed); United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 628-29
(1896) (conditions of succession to decedent's property are subject to dominion of state law and
legislature can take away or limit testamentary disposition); In re Pierce's Estate, 245 Iowa 22,
27, 60 N.W.2d 894, 898 (1953) (due process does not protect interested party's claim to share
of decedent's estate). But see Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U.S. 288, 290-91 (1918) (statute depriving
distribution of estate to heirs of intestate American Indian held void). Compare Tilley, The
Mullane Case: New Notice Requirements, 30 MICH. ST. B.J. 12, 17 (1951) (citing authority that
right to decedent's estate is vested property right protected under due process clause of fourteenth
amendment) with Constitutionality of No-Notice Provisions, supra note 124, at 325 (United
States Constitution does not guarantee succession to decedent's estate).
132. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text (argument that due process protections
apply to non-constitutionally guaranteed right to succeed to decedent's property).
133. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text (discussion of full faith and credit
argument).
134. See U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1 (each state must accord full faith and credit to judicial
proceedings of every other state); see also Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139, 150
(1868) (maxim that personal property governed under law of decedent's domicile proceeds on
fiction that law of owner's domicile regulates personal property of decedent wherever situated).
See generally Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM.
L. REV. 153 (1949) (history and judicial interpretation of full faith and credit clause); Corwin,
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 371 (1933) (in-depth analysis of intention
and operation of full faith and credit clause).
135. See Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 353 (1942) (full faith and credit
clause does not require that second state treat first adjudication of decedent's domicile as
conclusive on assets situated outside first state); Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214, 217 (1900)
(in in rem proceedings court possesses power to conclude issue "against the world" only as to
assets within court's territorial jurisdiction).
136. See Matter of Estate of Wimbush, 41 Colo. App. 289, 291, 587 P.2d 796, (1978) (full
faith and credit denied because of inadequate notice in probate proceeding). In Matter of Estate
of Wimbush, a Hawaii bank and named personal representative of a decedent's estate filed a
petition to probate the decedent's will in a Hawaii probate court. Id. at 290, 587 P.2d at 797.
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faith and credit to the Virginia probate. 37 Denial of full faith and credit to
a Virginia probate decision likely will occur in a state imposing more stringent
notice requirements for probate and estate administration. 38 Since an increas-
ing number of states require greater notice to interested parties, Virginia
probate decisions may encounter increased full faith and credit problems. 39
Since several substantial arguments suggest that Virginia probate and
estate administration notice requirements violate due process of law, the
revisions necessary to align the Virginia notice requirements with the Supreme
Court's mandate in Mennonite entail substantial amendments to several
sections of the Virginia Code. 40 First, the Virginia legislature should amend
the ex parte probate provision in Virginia Code section 64.1-85 to include a
statutory duty on the part of the executor or administrator to conduct a
diligent search of the decedent's records and to prepare a list of possible
interested parties.' 4' Examples of individuals the executor or administrator
should list are heirs under the applicable intestacy statute, named beneficiaries
Devisees under the will and heirs under the applicable intestacy statute received mailed notice.
Id., 587 P.2d at 797. The interested parties filed waivers of further notice. Id., 587 P.2d at
797. The court dismissed probate of the will because the decedent's marriage subsequent to the
execution of the will revoked the will under Hawaii law. Id., 587 P.2d at 797. The interested
parties received no notice of the dismissal, and the wife of the decedent acting as administrator
of the estate published notice of the intestacy hearing. Id. at 291, 587 P.2d at 797. Although
the administrator knew the interested parties names and addresses the interested parties were
not sent mailed notice. Id., 587 P.2d at 797. Since the decedent owned personal property
situated in Colorado, the administrator petitioned the Denver Probate Court for adjudication
of the decedent's intestacy. Id., 587 P.2d at 797. However, the interested parties admitted the
subject will for formal probate. Id., 587 P.2d at 797. The Denver Probate Court denied probate
of the will and the interested parties appealed. Id., 587 P.2d at 797. The Colorado Appeals
Court reversed the probate court and refused to grant full faith and credit to the decision on
the ground that the interested parties received insufficient notice of the dismissal of the Hawaii
probate. Id., 587 P.2d at 798. The Wimbush court reasoned that although a change in Hawaii
law invalidated the will, the interested parties were entitled to additional notice to provide the
interested parties an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 292-93, 587 P.2d at 798.
137. See Thorman v. Frame, 176 U.S. 350, 356 (1900) (full faith and credit clause does
not prevent inquiry into jurisdiction of first state court and possibility of reopening jurisdictional
issue in probate proceeding in second state). Cf. Hanson v. Denckle, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958)
(second state court is under no obligation to give full faith and credit to invalid judgment of
prior state court concerning corpus of settlor's trust).
138. See Comment, The Unconstitutionality of the Notice Provisions of the Texas Probate
Code, 23 Sw. L.J. 890, 903-04 (1969) (delineation of full faith and credit argument).
139. Id.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 141-45 (discussion of suggested changes to align
Virginia Code notice provisions with due process requirements of Mennonite).
141. See VA. CODE § 64.1-85 (1980) (exparte probate does not require notice to any party);
VA. CODE § 64.1-134 (1980) (if decedent's estate includes real property, personal representative
furnishes court or clerk with list of names and addresses of heirs under Virginia intestacy
statute); see also California Probate Proceedings, supra note 105, at 1123 (thorough search of
decedent's records facilitates notice to interested parties); Due Process, supra note 129, at 562
(advocating diligent search to find names and addresses of interested parties).
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under any prior wills or codicils, and creditors.' 42 Second, the Virginia
legislature should extend the Virginia Code section 64.1-89 one year time
period to contest the probate of the decedent's estate. 43 Extending the one
year contest provision would enable interested parties who receive insufficient
notice of the probate proceedings to bring a timely claim against the original
distributee, administrator, or executor. 44 Third, Virginia lawmakers should
amend Virginia Code sections 64.1-171 and 64.1-179 to require mailed notice
to known or ascertainable creditors of the decedent or decedent's estate
before any proceeding to distribute estate assets.
45
In addition to requiring mailed notice to heirs, legatees, devisees, credi-
tors, and other interested parties who are known or ascertainable after a
diligent search of the decedent's records, the Virginia Code must supply
adequate remedies for known or ascertainable interested parties who the
executor or administrator fails to notify of the probate proceedings. 46 The
remedies should take into account the party in possession of the decedent's
property and the underlying goal of finality in distribution of a decedent's
estate. 47 Aside from the aggrieved interested party, three other individuals
should be afforded protection under a remedial scheme. 4 First, the Virginia
Code should protect a bona fide purchaser who, without notice of possible
adverse claims, acquires the decedent's property from the original distribu-
tee. 49 Second, the Virginia Code should adopt a satisfactory statutory time
period designed to protect the original distributee against subsequent late
claims of unnotified interested parties. 5 0 Finally, the Virginia Code must
protect the executor or administrator who in good faith distributes the assets
of the decedent's estate.' 5' If the executor or administrator fails to mail
142. See Due Process, supra note 129, at 562 (discussion of executor's and administrator's
quest for discovering interested individuals).
143. See VA. CODE § 64.1-89 (1980) (providing one year period to contest probate of
decedent's will).
144. See Due Process, supra note 129, at 562 (advocating extension of time period for
interested parties to challenge probate distribution).
145. See VA. CODE §§ 64.1-171, -179 (1980) (requiring notice to creditors of decedent's
estate by publishing and posting but not through mail); see also Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley,
100 Nev. 74,-, 686 P.2d 20, 21 (1984) (requiring mailed notice to known creditors of
decedent's estate).
146. See supra text accompanying note 145 (suggesting due process requirement of mailed
notice to known or ascertainable interested parties in decedent's estate).
147. See infra text accompanying notes 148-51 (discussion of competing interests deserving
protection of remedial scheme).
148. See infra text accompanying notes 149-51 (analysis of various interests in probate
notice remedy scheme).
149. See California Probate Proceedings, supra note 105, at 1124 (discussion of protections
for bona fide purchasers of assets from decedent's estate).
150. See id. at 1124-25 (original distributee's reliance interest is deserving of protection
after sufficient length of time).
151. See VA. CODE § 64.1-179 (1980) (providing protection for executor or administrator
who complies with Virginia Code provisions for distribution of decedent's estate).
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notice to an interested party whose name and address were reasonably
ascertainable and who otherwise would have prevailed in a claim against the
decedent's estate, then the interested party should be permitted to bring suit
against the original distributee.' s2 However, if the original distributee sold
the decedent's property to a bond fide purchaser, or if the period for an
interested party to contest the distribution has expired, then the interested
party still should be permitted to seek damages from the executor or
administrator for breach of fiduciary duty in failing to notify the interested
party of the probate and subsequent administration of the decedent's estate
by mail.'53 Conversely, if the original distributee still is in possession of the
property and the period for an interested party to contest has not yet expired,
a court can impose a constructive trust on the property in favor of the
interested party.
5 4
Virginia's ex parte probate and requirements of published and posted
notice of estate administration proceedings are constitutionally infirm because
the notice provisions violate due process rights guaranteed under the four-
teenth amendment.155 The fourteenth amendment protects the property inter-
ests of interested parties by requiring that such parties receive adequate notice
of probate and estate administration proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard. 5 6 The current Virginia probate and estate administration notice
requirements invite due process challenges from interested parties to an estate
or creditors who are known or ascertainable and do not receive notice by
mail.' 7 The Virginia legislature and judiciary, however, continue to uphold
the notice provisions embodied in the Virginia Code.' In light of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Mennonite, and the subsequent Supreme
Court of Nevada decision in Moseley II, the Virginia legislature should
amend the notice provisions in both probate and estate administration. 
59
The United States Supreme Court could use reasoning similar to that used
152. See supra text accompanying note 147 (executor's or administrator's duty is to ensure
diligent search of decedent's effects in order to ascertain names of interested parties to decedent's
estate).
153. See VA. CODE § 64.1-179 (1980) (good faith diligent search fully protects executor or
administrator from creditors' claims). Executors and administrators can purchase refunding
bonds to mitigate possible liability for breach of notice requirements. Id. at § 64.1-178; see id.
at § 64.1-177 (1980) (waiver of refunding bond renders executor or administrator liable to
creditors for improperly distributed real or personal property).
154. See Due Process, supra note 129, at 563 (proposing constructive trust on property
distributee received or proceeds from sale of distributed decedent's property in hands of original
distributee).
155. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (state must not deprive individual of property
without due process of law).
156. See Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 413 (1900) (notice must afford interested parties
time to make appearance before adjudicating significant property interests).
157. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text (analysis of Virginia ex parte probate
and notice in estate administration proceedings).
158. See id.
159. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2712 (1983) (adopting
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in Moseley II to extend the Mennonite notice requirements to probate and
estate administration proceedings. 60 The Virginia legislature or judiciary
should reconsider the statutory notice requirements and rectify possible due
process violations.
GARY B. KLINE
broad notice requirement); Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 100 Nev. 74,- , 686 P.2d 20,
21 (1984) (holding that known or ascertainable creditors of decedent's estate must receive mailed
notice of any proceeding affecting property interest).
160. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussion of notice requirements under
Mennonite); notes 89-94 and accompanying text (discussion of Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley).
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